Miguel

There is that oversimplification that you mention. I was wondering/hoping that your introduction was going to segue into a questioning of the assumption that the failure to feel good stems from a lack of want or will or desire to feel good. The current assumption is:

  • If one truly wants to feel good, then one will feel good. And if one is not feeling good, then it’s because one don’t truly want to feel good.

Have you examined that particular assumption or arrived at a definite conclusion that a failure to feel good stems from a failure to (properly) want same?

(An organism may deeply desire something yet still be incapable of attaining it for all kinds of reasons, and not for a failure of wanting, choosing, or even trying.)

I don’t have a comment on the rest of your post at this time. The rest of what you wrote hinges, I think at least to some degree, on the validity of that initial assumption/conclusion.