Hmm… Indeed you didn’t say it, I presumed it as said based on what one would typically consider to be experiencing something.
What then, would it mean for you, to say that a spider was experienced?
Take two situations:
A: 1) a sensation is experienced on your leg that feels like a spider, 2) you turn your head to look at your leg, and 3) you see no spider there
B: 1) a sensation is experienced on your leg that feels like a spider, 2) you turn your head to look at your leg, and 3) you do see a spider there
Would you say that in B1 a spider is experienced but not in A1? And if there is a difference, how can it be, because the situations are identical up to that point (they only differ at 3). That is you only know afterwards whether it was indeed a spider.
And then for B3, would you say a spider is experienced? But if so, why? If the sensation of touch that a spider would produce doesn’t count as experiencing a spider, then the sensation of sight that a spider would produce also shouldn’t count. So you wouldn’t be experiencing a spider in B3 either. If so then what would count for you as experiencing a spider?
And indeed as you never experience objects directly - you only experience sensory input - how can you say anything exists other than the sensations of sight, touch, sound, etc., that you experience? Or are you saying only the sensations exist and nothing else?
Further does anything exist outside of your personal experience? And if so how do you know?
This can’t be answered meaningfully until we’re on the same page of what counts for you as “existence” (see above) - which is why I don’t want to answer this question directly yet.
The experience, ‘spider,’ is the moment the mind recognizes enough cues to say, ‘spider.’
That is why it takes only a tickling sensation (real or imagined) on the leg for the mind to say, ‘spider.’
For the mind, in that moment, the spider is real.
Any further verification in the positive (yes spider) or negative (no spider) does not genuinely tell us if there is in fact a spider or not, as all could be additional layers of hallucination (or ‘matrix’ as rick points out).
However, what the actual experience consists of is apperception.
In apperception, with no belief-ridden ‘being’ being the ‘experiencer,’ the ‘imaginer,’ then the pure qualia is experienced with no additional imaginative-feeling layers happening.
The example I remember Richard using is, ‘that is a bicycle’ (upon seeing a bicycle.)
As opposed to remaining in the pure, direct experiencing of the actuality happening:
In that brief scintillating instant of bare awareness, that twinkling sensorium-moment of consciousness being conscious of being consciousness, one apperceives a thing as a nothing-in-particular that is being naught but what-it-is coming from nowhen and going nowhere at all.
The actuality can only be apperceived… it is the felt veil, ‘me,’ that creates reality, near-instantly inserting a ‘real’ spider where a moment before there was a bare moment of apperception.
The bare moment of apperception is the actual… and the eight-legged biter, ‘spider,’ can be apperceived - as can a phantom itch on the leg with no spider present.
In apperception one still hasn’t verified until the trouser-leg has been pulled up to reveal the source of the sensation.
But there is no ‘reality’ informing ‘what is going on’ (and thus blocking the actual experience from eventuating), and even replacing any actual spider with a ‘real’ spider.
edit:
And, by the way, any attempt by ‘me’ to experience the material-actual is useless, as I am eternally replacing the actual things with ‘my’ version of it, clouded by emotional meanings. I’ve been experimenting lately with ‘cold, stark, barren’ reality, in which ‘I’ am seeing clearly ‘my’ cold, materialistic reality… cold, barren meaningless surfaces… an extra-sneaky moment of ‘me’ replacing the actual with ‘cold, material’ things. The actual is never cold, barren, or meaningless.
Yes, precisely. I’m still giving Claudiu’s excellent queries deeper thought as I go about my business, stopping here and there to wonder about it, and I intend at the moment to provide a more comprehensive and thought-out response later on (or maybe this post will suffice?), which may or may not end up being aligned with what I say in this comment, but what you say here strikes as true at the moment, tentatively-speaking.
So as to be completely in accord with what is indisputable, when one perceives an object and has committed to identifying it, one cannot know with 100 percent assurance whether one has correctly identified or has correctly recognized the perceived object. All that can be known with 100 percent assurance is that an object, a something – such as a shape, color, texture, form, thought, emotion – has happened and has been perceived. This is what can be said to have been experienced. When an object is perceived, say visually and tactilely, then the cognitive process of identification and recognition is automatically applied to the object, categorizing it, and spitting out a label that accords with what the identification process has discerned the object to resemble, in this case “spider”, whereupon further response and interaction ensues, such as feeling horrified or jumping out of one’s seat. The act of identification and recognition that leads up to the classification label “spider” is liable to be, and remarkably often-enough is, erroneous or inaccurate. The perceived object can easily be misidentified, misrecognized, or misclassified. Perhaps it was a cricket rather than a spider; it could have been a stray cotton ball, an hallucination, or it could have indeed been a spider afterall. Yet whatever it was, what is indisputable is that it was an object of perception, something that appeared to one’s consciousness. This is what is being indisputably experienced: the object itself (correctly or erroneously identified).
Is this not fundamentally what “objective” existence is about: the occurrence of the object? Experience occurs when an existent object (“objective existence”) appears or presents itself before, or opposite to, the subject. It is the subject’s observation and encounter with the object (“objective existence”) that produces the experience. Etymologically “object” means “that which presents itself to the sight”:
object (n.): late 14c. … from Old French object and directly from Medieval Latin obiectum “thing put before” (the mind or sight), noun use of neuter of Latin obiectus “lying before, opposite” … from Latin obiectus “that which presents itself to the sight.” Meaning “that toward which a cognitive act is directed” is from 1580s. object | Etymology, origin and meaning of object by etymonline
The cognitive and affective processes that arise in response to the objects that appear before the subject are also indisputably occurring and are themselves being experienced; they are objects themselves appearing before the subject. Etymologically “experience” means “observation as the source of knowledge”:
experience (n.): late 14c., “observation as the source of knowledge; actual observation; an event which has affected one,” from Old French esperience “experiment, proof, experience” (13c.), from Latin experientia “a trial, proof, experiment; knowledge gained by repeated trials …” experience | Search Online Etymology Dictionary
Observation requires both subject and object. If there is no object, there is no observation. The existence of the object is a necessary requisite for the experience to take place. Without object, there is no experience to be had thus no knowledge to be gained (of even the most basic variety such as: “experience exists”). No object, no experience; and if there is experience, there is object.
Regarding the inherent accuracy-rate of the identification process – whether the object on the leg is a spider or not, whether the object identified as “leg” is a leg or not – involves matters of probability and functionality occurring mostly automatically and unconsciously, which could be expressed as, “it is probably [this] or it is probably [that] so let’s operate on those assumptions and hope for the best.” Therefore to assert as an indisputable fact that a spider is being experienced is to miss the mark, somewhat, and get caught up in a presumptive, superficial, and sometimes contentious – though perhaps functionally necessary – identification process. It is experience which is happening; it is object by whatever name which is being experienced; it is object by whatever name which exists and is known to exist because it is object by whatever name which is being experienced. Without object there is no experience; without experience there is no knowledge of object. Object and experience (object and subject?) are intertwined in lockstep. I cannot fathom how there can ever be an experience – an encounter or awareness – of an object that does not exist. It is inconceivable.
(tentatively-speaking, still exploring …)
Richard made some remarks that resonate here:
Richard (2004): Other than being apperceptively aware of infinitude I am already ‘clueless’ about the universe. Mailing List 'AF' Respondent No. 49
(2004)
RESPONDENT: Do you, perchance, know what the sun actually is?
RICHARD: No, virtually the only thing regarding the properties of the universe that is readily apparent here in this actual world is its infinitude … matters such as what a star/ planet/ moon/ comet is require observation and illation. Mailing List 'AF' Respondent No. 60
Just a brief note to aid in your continued exploration…
If the cognitive and affective processes (along with the sensate ones) are also objects appearing before “the subject”… then what, precisely, is the subject?
If anything that is experienced is an object then that would mean the subject can never be experienced, because by experiencing the subject it would then become an object as well. Is this the case - can the subject be experienced? Can the subject experience itself? What is the subject after all - what is it that is experiencing all this?
More great questions. The subject appears to be able to reflect on itself, and become the object. Object on object? Some kind of subject/ object merger? Pure objectivity? The subject and object already appear inextricably linked. It’s difficult to draw the line between where the subject ends and the object begins, and vice versa.
Due in part to the fact that without object there is no subject. The object makes the subject, it makes the experience. The line between the two is arbitrary. So why not say it is all subject then? Or all object then? Pure subjectivity vs pure objectivity? The latter strikes as more correct than the former, but still seems off at the moment. There is just existence and that’s it. Then there is awareness of existence, then awareness of awareness of existence, which is just more existence.
I’m keeping in mind that this is still an ongoing exploratory process for you, but a few notes…
Hmm not quite. You are conflating the existence of the object itself (see below) with the experience/occurrence of the object (aka qualia: an “individual instance of subjective, conscious experience”).
The word “objective” in the phrase “objective existence” refers to objectivity:
Note well that last part there - objectivity deals with that which is without a sentient subject.
For another definition:
The terms “objectivity” and “subjectivity,” in their modern usage, generally relate to a perceiving subject (normally a person) and a perceived or unperceived object. The object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. In other words, the object would be there, as it is, even if no subject perceived it. Hence, objectivity is typically associated with ideas such as reality, truth and reliability. [emphasis added]
Source: Objectivity | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Thus by definition, objective existence has naught to do with the occurrence or experience of an object (i.e. the qualia it results in), but rather simply the object in and of itself independent of any experience of it.
Now that it is clear that the term “object”, in this context of objective existence, refers to “that which exists independent of the subject’s perception of it”, some of what you wrote can be more clearly rephrased, emphasis on the rephrasings:
Indeed essentially what you’re saying in the last sentence is that it’s inconceivable to experience a qualia without experiencing a qualia - which is of course tautologically true. The fact that a qualia was experienced means that a qualia was experienced – it’s not possible to experience qualia without experiencing a qualia.
But now that it’s clear that “object” and “qualia” are two distinct things, it’s clear the topic under discussion is whether a qualia can occur, without an objectively (i.e. independently) existing object giving rise to that qualia.
And this is why I gave the example of the spider being experienced - as what I mean by “I experienced a spider” is “I experienced qualia that I, without necessarily applying cognition, understood to be an objectively existing spider” - which as you wrote it’s certainly possible to do - and it later turned out that that qualia originated not from an objectively existing spider (as in the weight of the spider touching skin cells triggering neuronal signals giving rise to the qualia of touch) but rather from some other source (something of unknown etiology triggering similar neuronal signals that gave rise to identical qualia) - and therefore it is apparently possible to, so to say “experience something that doesn’t exist” (i.e. experience qualia not appertaining to an objectively existing object).
Which is also why the topic of illusions is so relevant to all this.
Also as a brief aside, the notion that only qualia can be certain to be known, and everything else is unsure, is an aspect of solipsism:
As an epistemological position, solipsism is impossible to refute - as the refuter and whatever they say also might not exist outside the mind - and, being impossible to refute, it’s not worth engaging in a debate as to whether it is true or not. But if this position seems appealing to you I’d recommend Richard’s holding-your-breath experiment:
RICHARD: One has to just try putting a spring clip upon one’s nose and a large piece of sticking plaster over one’s mouth for a few minutes to discover what actuality is. As one rips the plaster from one’s mouth and gulps in that sweet and actual air, one knows that one is certainly here on earth, living this life. Mailing List 'B' Respondent No. 23
Uh oh … I wonder if we’re getting a bit off track now.
You have introduced the term “qualia” into the discussion and inserted it everywhere where I used the word “object”. I presumed the word “object” to be unambiguous and I also presumed I had a good grasp on what it meant. As for “qualia” – which seems to be inextricably associated with, and inherently presupposes, the experience + existence of an object – I’ll need to first get a handle on the meaning and usage of this term, and specifically what it means to you, before I can hope to respond with any degree of coherency.
At this stage I’m not sure whether it would be best to ask you to revisit or disregard my attempt to etymologically link the word “objective” to its root word “object” – the contemporary usage of the word “objective” appeared to me to be too removed from its foundational origins – while providing the historical meaning of the word “object” so that it would be clear where I was coming from. So I’ll just express that uncertainty and leave it at that for now.
Understood - just briefly though what I’m getting at in plainer terms is that it seems to me from what I read so far that you’re equating a perception of an objectively existing object , with the objectively existing object itself. Ie you’re treating them as one and the same thing. Roughly qualia just means the subjective experience, ie perception, of an object - which is different than the object itself (that exists on its own).
It’s possible you aren’t doing this but it seemed you were so I thought I’d bring it up. I kept the word “object” where you appeared to be referring to the externally-existing thing and replaced it with the word “qualia” where you appeared to be referring to the perception of a thing.
But I’ll leave it here for now and wait for a fuller answer as time permits :).
For the sake of consistency, what I would be “saying in the last sentence” (acquiescing in arguendo to the replacement of my words) is not that it is “inconceivable to experience a qualia without experiencing a qualia”, but that it would be “inconceivable to experience a qualia that does not exist”. Even though I’m shaky on what “qualia” precisely means I can still respond meaningfully here as you could have used the word “pineapple” and the grammatical and logical format would remain misrepresented. Nevertheless all the better to have used the word “qualia” as, from what I have gathered, there is at least one presupposition inherent to what that word signifies: (1) for there to be qualia of either an experience or an object, or an experience of an object (depending on definition) there has to first exist both experience and object.
As originally stated, there can be no experience of something that does not exist. Now, with the term you find more fitting: there can be no qualia of something that does not exist.
This whole topic reminds of this excerpt, apologies for its length, external nature, and that although YMMV it seems VERY relevant to this topic.
“It does not follow from the above that he who
undertakes to follow the Path of the Secret Teachings
is thrown wholly on his own resources. By no means.
He is put face to face with certain facts, facts which
have always seemed to him so obvious that he has
never given them a moment’s thought, and the
Master says to him: ''Now investigate whether these
facts which you accept as representing a reality are,
truly, real. Examine them attentively and at length,
putting aside all preconceived ideas, empty your mind
of all the opinions which it has harboured concerning
these facts ; doubt that which you have mechanically
admitted up to the present, look as you would look
at quite new things, those which form your physical
environment; you will then investigate the mental
reactions to which they give rise.
To examine the people among whom we find
ourselves, to investigate the manifold phenomena
which continually arise and disappear around us, and
then to reach the point at which we examine the
spectator of this spectacle, whom we call “I”, that is
truly an interesting programme which promises unforeseen discoveries.
To whom should we address our questions to
obtain information about the world? From whom
have we received that knowledge which we already
possess?—
The reply is: from our senses.
We have seen, heard, tasted, smelt, touched
various objects, either material or of a more tenuous
nature. We have given names to these various
objects, we have classified them in series of similar
objects, we have built up, with them, a world which
has become familiar to us in the same way as we
furnish a house in which we live.
It is now a matter of shaking off the sluggishness
created by the habit of busying ourselves without
curiosity in our world, persuaded that the nature of
its paraphernalia is perfectly known to us.
It is a matter of suspecting the information given
us by our senses. Is this information true? - Do not
wc ourselves add, on our own authority, various accre
tions for which our senses are in no way responsible?
Let us see:
You happen to be in a vast, bare plain, and in
the distance you see a fleck of green standing out on
the yellow sand. What is the size of the fleck which
you see?—Measure it in comparison with an upright
object at eye-level, a ruler or even your finger. To
what height on the ruler or on your finger does the
green spot come?—Mark this height. It may be
equal to the top joint of your little finger or even
smaller ; it may be just a point.
If you have not already done it, you can, pro
visionally, stop at this very rudimentary experiment.
What have you seen? - You have seen a green
spot of the size which you measured. You have seen
that and nothing more. To say that you have seen
a tree in the distance is incorrect. Your eyes did not
show you a tree with leafy branches able to shelter
you from the sun’s rays. The idea of the tree and its
representation in your mind are the results of mental
activity which has been set in motion by the sight
of the tiny fleck of green.
Many elements have been combined in this
activity. One can put, in the first case, habit, memory.
Other green spots seen in similar conditions have led
to the finding of a tree at the end of a plain. This
has been remembered. In a general way one knows
also that distance gives a dwarfed image of objects
seen, and this too has been remembered.
Nevertheless these are Tatiocinations and not the
fact of having seen a tree. It is probable that walk
ing towards the green spot, he who saw it will find
a tree, but this is not certain. The fleck of green may
he found to be a building painted green, the green
canvas of a tent, or something else which is not a tree.
A higher degree of probability, if not certainty may
he attained if, to the perception of the colour green,
were to be added that of outlines suggesting the
shape of a tree. But again, how many times will not
the mental activity, applied to the sensation of seeing
a green spot, go astray?—Dazzlement caused by the
sun, mirages, can cause us to see not only green spots
but trees and many other objects although these have
no corresponding substance.
In short, what kind of information has been
given to us by the fact of having seen a green spot?—
It has simply made us conscious of having felt a
sensation. A sensation, nothing more, all the rest is
interpretation. In the same way, all our perceptions,
those to which we give names and assign form, colour,
or no matter what attributes, are nothing but inter
pretations of a fugitive contact by one of our senses
with a stimulus.
Thus we are led to contemplate the co-existence
of two worlds: that of pure contact not coloured by
the screen of ‘‘memories”, and that created by the
mental formations (the samskaras): the interpretation.
The first of these worlds represents Reality, and
is indescribable ; we cannot think anything, cannot
imagine anything about it without “interpreting and
thus destroying its character of Reality. Reality is
inexpressible and inconceivable.
The second of these worlds is ahat of mental
formations set in motion by the contact-stimulus. It
is the world in which we live. To say that it is not
real does not mean that it is devoid of existence.”
Alexandra David-Neel and Lama Yongden, “The Secret Oral Teachings in Tibetan Buddhist Sects”
Goodness me. That is remarkable, Dan. A bit eerie, actually.
Intentionally saying nothing of the rest of the excerpt I’ll just tongue-in-cheek remark how I would have liked to have had a brief discussion with “The Master” about that singular point (it’s low-hanging fruit ).
Out of curiosity, do you know the name of the person who spoke those words in the excerpt. In the text it says “the Master” but is that referring to someone in particular? I located a pdf of a 1967 edition of the book and found the excerpt but I didn’t see a reference to any particular person. I skimmed the beginning chapters but didn’t see an individual’s name. Is it the Buddha or Nagarjuna or was it an unnamed contemporary monk who was speaking, do you know?
Hmm, so a qualia is not an object in the way a pineapple is an object. A qualia is an “individual instance of subjective, conscious experience”. The qualia is the experience. This affects the grammar and logic of the sentence, and it’s not clear what you would mean by saying an experience exists or doesn’t exist. Existence usually refers to things, not experiences. It might help the conversation if you clarify what you mean by whether an experience “exists”.
The process of perception of an objectively existing object goes roughly as follows:
A. There is an objectively existing object - say, a spider.
B. In the case of vision, light reflects off the spider into the rods and cones in an eyeball. The light triggers nerve impulses in the rods & cones, which trigger further nerve impulses, etc., which eventually results, via a poorly-understood process (see: Hard Problem of Consciousness), in…
C. The qualia that is a visual perception of a spider.
Thus:
The thing-that-exists, the objective existence part of it, is the object: A.
The subjective experience side of it, the side occurring in consciousness, is the qualia: C.
When there is a debate over whether things objectively exist, the debate is generally about A, not about C.
Possibly this whole time you’ve had C in mind while I’ve had A in mind, which is why we haven’t seen eye-to-eye yet.
That being said, if you have been keeping A and C clear and distinct in your mind, then it appears your position is essentially that, if there is a qualia (C) (i.e. if there is an experience), there necessarily is an object that objectively exists (A) that gave rise to the qualia (C). Let me know if this is a mischaracterization of your position.
But you have yet to demonstrate this. This isn’t a premise, but a conclusion, and so you must support this conclusion – unless you are taking it as a premise/an axiom indeed, in which case it’s not refutable – and there is not much use in debating it, and you are free to build whatever logical structures that logically derive from said premise. But a deduction from a logical chain is only as valid as its premises.
Briefly, it doesn’t make sense to talk of qualia of an experience, as the qualia is the experience.
That is yet to be determined… and now that we have the shared word “qualia” we can have a deeper discussion about it.
Before proceeding it would be good if you were to confirm whether you think there are objects that have objective existence - i.e. that exist in the world in and of themselves, regardless of any conscious perception of it? If not then this is the point to debate and the rest can only follow once this point is resolved.
Presuming that you do think objects can objectively exist, I’ll take another crack at what you wrote earlier…
We are in agreement thus far.
Are shape, color, texture, and form, really objects (A), or are they qualia (C)? Because it sounds like you are describing artifcats of (visual and tactile) perception (C), not things in the world (A). And if so, then what you are really saying here is not that we have 100% assurance that an object (A) has been perceived, but rather that we have 100% assurance that a qualia became present in consciousness (C) - i.e. all we know is that an experience occurred (C). If that is all we can know, then this doesn’t say anything in and of itself about the existence of whatever (A) might have given rise to that qualia (C).
Indeed.
D’accord.
Here again you appear to be referring, not to objectively existing objects in the world as they are (A), but rather qualia (C) - i.e. not an object in-and-of-itself (A) but an “object of perception”, which is another way of saying that which we perceive, i.e. the perception itself (C). It’s the subjective experience side of it (C), not the objective existence side of it (A). So in other words you are again saying that all that is indisputable is that there was an experience - and indeed there is no dispute about that.
But the dispute is about whether this (C) necessarily implies an (A) that gave rise to it.
To leave off with some questions to further the discussion…
In [Y], it is clear the object (A) is the spider, and the qualia (C) is the sensation. In [X], the qualia (C) is the same sensation, but what is the object (A)?
For another example, compare the scenario of [Q] you are looking at a tree, and [R] you are dreaming a tree. In [Q], the object (A) is the tree, and the qualia (C) is the visual and perhaps olfactory experience of the tree. In [R] the qualia (C) is (roughly) the same, but what is the object (A)?
For a third example, when someone is imagining Santa Claus coming down the chimney bringing presents, what is the qualia (C) and what is the object (A)?
do you know the name of the person who spoke those words
my ass-u-me-ption was that it was an un-named person talking to a 3rd party in the presence of the writer but i cannot recall what, in the writing, left that impression
as a possibly relevant aside - the etymology of the word “existence” could be interpreted along the lines of “to stand out (separate) from (independent of)”
in which case, if “separation” is merely . . . an artifact of the way the (human) nervous system functions (natively and/or as socialized) and is “only” an interpretation (as opposed to (basal) reality (as in the excerpt))
then, based on that interpretation of “existence”, some thing that has existence would not necessarily be “actual”
Yes, I certainly do. I am confident that this universe and all the objects in it will go on existing without my experience/ awareness of them.
I just wanted to clear that up before addressing the other matters raised in the rest of your post. Looking forward to giving it plenty of thought as I go about the day.
I know I’ve been beating on this a lot (perhaps more than is necessary), but subjective implies a subject (aka a self) where in freedom there is no subject/self, which means direct perceiving (apperceiving) qualia, which is the closest one can perceive an actually-existing (non-solipsistic) object
So the ongoing moment of directly experiencing qualia (closest possible to the object itself) with no subject is why there is no center anymore… it is direct.
That’s true, but subjective has multiple definitions.
The typical one is “based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions” which does typically imply a ‘self’.
But is this context “subjective” means “dependent on the mind or on an individual’s perception for its existence.” A red/green color-blind actually free person will perceive a red & green apple together, differently, than a regularly-color-perceiving actually free person – i.e. the qualia will be different, it is subjective based on their individual sensory apparatuses/minds etc.
The distinction between pure consciousness and not is as you say, that with pure consciousness you apperceive the qualia, while when a feeling-being the pure qualia is immediately overlaid with hedonic tone, feelings, perceptions derived from the feelings, etc., before it comes to conscious perception.
It’s good to point it out and clarify what is meant here!
Myself and other actualists (by and large) consider the entire affective system, which includes all feelings and basic emotions – also referred to as instinctual passions – to be both innate to not only humans but all sentient beings (by and large). These basic emotions that almost all animals experience can be classified into roughly four categories: fear, aggression, nurture, and desire. Actualists consider these basic emotions to be unlearned, precognitive, and instinctual. For the human animal (saying nothing of the other animals right now), those basic instinctual emotions are further refined and cultivated into feelings such as guilt, envy, love, pride, etc., over the course of natural development with the aid of cognitive and social enculturation (learning) processes.
One of the themes introduced in this topic revolved around my questioning the basis for declaring the affective system to be non-actual when it was an irrefutable fact for an actualist that all animals – from the crocodile to the bat to the horse – were biologically equipped at conception with the affective system. How can it be, I wondered, that the observable and innate biological facility of a crocodile is not to be considered actual, when the word “actual” means “existing in fact”? How is it that I can observe and experience this feeling for myself while being told that it doesn’t in fact exist? So myself and other actualists have been contending with these (and other) matters, pursuing these (and other) thoughts, exploring now the very notion of what it is to exist. Maybe if we follow these thoughts to the very end something magical may occur, who’s to say?
“only the actual world exists”
Can you tell me if this is your opinion/understanding, or if it’s what you think AF claims, or both?
the ‘real world’ does not exist
Can you tell me if this is your opinion/understanding, or if it’s what you think AF claims, or both?
In your opinion, what is the meaning that Richard gives to “world” in those expressions? What do you think he is alluding to?
Or, may be, are you trying to emphasize that you don’t understand the difference (or even that the difference can’t be understanded) because there seems to be one or more contradictions in AF that prevent that understanding? In this case, please point them out.
If you have not forgotten them, but you do not want to or cannot dedicate time to answer them, there is no problem. However, I think it can be useful for @dhowell to know that in my opinion much of what has been written and continues to be written here is due to the development of derivative or lateral aspects (not only by @rick) as if @rick’s answer/position to those questions/statements were clear to all of us. They are not.
I think, @dhowell, that the fact that you are not an actualist makes important that you are aware of these problems when interpreting what you read here, and that much of @rick’s thoughts are not clear (it has become evident throughout the post) even to some of the actualists to whom @rick has alluded
(EDIT: to be clear, I am included among those who do not understand at least part of his thoughts because of what I explained in the post I referenced; and it’s why I asked him those questions)
it seems VERY relevant to this topic.
I’ll just tongue-in-cheek remark how I would have liked to have had a brief discussion with “The Master” about that singular point (it’s low-hanging fruit 
).